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Several Marine Corps Officers made improvements to the Marine Corps Schools, but no one officer had the impact of General James C. Breckinridge. 9 During his tenure as the Commandant of the Schools, 1932 Schools, -1935 , the direction of the curriculum changed considerably.
Breckinridge recognized the current methodology for the Marine Corps Schools was to present material to students, have them commit the information to memory and then regurgitate it on examinations. He viewed this method as counter to the true nature of education. 10 Breckinridge, codifying Lejeune's vision, moved to recast the Marine Corps Schools on the task of teaching officers to analyze problems and find solutions rather than merely relying on memorized book answers. The most substantial changes occurred when Breckinridge suspended traditional courses 6 Merrill L. Bartlett, Lejeune: A Marines Life, 1867 -1942 (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1996 , 120. 7 Fleming, Austin, and Braley III, Quantico, 41. 8 Lejeune, Reminiscences, 460. Reality (1966) . 19 According to Berger and Luckmann, as social institutions progress throughout history they develop norms, rules, and orders which stabilize their social structures. As stability increases, institutions become stronger and gain more control, and acceptance of the role of the institution within the society perceived and understood in theory as legitimation. 20 The purpose of legitimation is to "explain and justify" the existing institutions so that their presence is seen by individuals as "subjectively plausible and acceptable."
21
Institutions objectified in the reality of everyday life become fully manifested when knowledge is transferred to the next generation and learned as objective truth and internalized as subjective reality.
22
Through more than a decade of the Marine Corps' existence, legitimation of the organization both internally and externally in society was directly tied to the U.S. Navy as the ship riders. The transmission of knowledge within the Marine Corps passed from the commanding officers and veterans to the next generation of Marines socially -no formal education existed. As the Marine Corps' roles and responsibilities grew, the need for a formal 19 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. "There's a mindset of flexibility and adaptability that comes with us. We don't mind hardship. We don't mind somebody saying, 'Go in and do this nasty job.' Whatever the job is, we can do it. That's why the nation has a Marine Corps." -General James F. Amos, 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps
For over the first century of their existence the Marine Corps' functions became well defined. At sea, Marines maintained good order and discipline and were responsible for the ships internal security. In combat, they became the ship's small-arms fighters: sniping from the fighting tops, and on deck spearheading boarding parties in close action or repelling enemy boarders. 26 Anonymous, "The Marine Corps Association. Its Formation and Objects," The Marine Corps Gazette 1 no. 1 (March 1916), 73-76.
Ashore they guarded naval installations, both at home and abroad, and upon occasion conducted small incursions on land. Marines were also available as trained landing parties, either to seize positions on hostile shores, or to protect the lives and property of nationals in foreign countries.
27
The ships guard responsibility, inexorably linked to the U.S. Navy and objectified by society, established a narrative that the Marine Corps generally accepted as its reason to exist.
However, the Marine Corps had no formal education system designed to train new members or continually develop Marines professionally. 28 The Millet, Semper Fidelis, 43, [77] [78] [79] [80] [98] [99] [105] [106] [107] excel beyond a minimum standard. 31 Commissioning was typically cronyistic, a system in place since the founding of the Corps. Many officers served in the Marine Corps to fulfill military service obligations directly tied to family and political connections or because they could not gain a commission in the U.S. Army or Navy. 32 Unlike the other two military services, the Marine
Corps did not have a service academy to produce officers specifically for duty in the Marines.
Complicating issues further, very few political appointees remained in service for long and had Ibid., 87-88. 32 Williams, "The Education of a Marine Officer," 16. 33 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 65-68. 34 Dirk Anthony Ballendorf and Merrill L. Bartlett, Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet, 1880 -1923 (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997 , 21. 35 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 79-81. group of officers. 36 It also helped to form a commonality of knowledge and some institutional order in the distribution of that knowledge. However, it did not produce a system of instructing officers into soldiers of the sea -a traditional term for Marines with direct ties to the U.S. Navy.
The Marine Corps still lacked a formal school system to educate newly commissioned officers and one that professionally developed officers throughout their career.
School of Application
On 1 October 1890, Congress passed an Act requiring all U.S. Army officers, below the rank of brigadier general, to pass an examination before consideration for promotion. The Colonel Commandant takes pleasure in formally announcing to the Marine Corps the establishment of a School of Application at the headquarters of the Corps, with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy, as contained in the following Communication:
Sir: The Department is in receipt of your communication of the 13 th instant, submitting for its consideration an outline of the course of instruction for a School of Application, at the headquarters of the Marine Corps, for officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the Corps; and the course of instruction for the School, as proposed, is in accordance with your Recommendation, approved.
Very Respectfully, B.F. TRACY Secretary of the Navy. 
41
From its inception, the School of Application, plagued by constant disruptions, repeatedly lost attendees drawn to support expeditionary operations, a general lack of interest from prospective students, and an overall deficiency in the necessary funding and material. In 1898, the school closed due to the need for Marines in the Spanish-American War, though the conclusion of the war did not reduce the growing demand for Marines at home and abroad. In 1903, the school moved to Annapolis, Maryland and reopened, but due to unsatisfactory conditions and very few officers for training, the school closed again in 1907. During this time, the school was moved to Naval Station Port Royal, South Carolina (now Parris Island) and was renamed the Marine competing narratives that continued to create tension within the Marine Corps as to its true purpose and threatened its future existence. 52 Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 10-11. 53 Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 11-15.
In addition to the Advance Base School, Marines had the opportunity to attend the U.S. Outlined in the initial Constitution set forth the purposes of the Association as follows:
"The purposes for which the Association is formed are to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among its members, and to provide for their professional advancement; to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; to increase the efficiency thereof; and to further the interests of the military and naval services in all ways not inconsistent with the good of the general government." "The war expanded the human mind, it has incited it to thoughts which heretofore lay hidden in the recesses of the brain. The men are thinking. The officers must think, too -and think hard that the same relationship as of old…The same qualities of leadership be maintained…The war was a stimulus to thought -it was an awakening -a renaissance." "A great many of us have had a desire for a long time to see a school established where officers will learn their duties as captains and field officers. Our officers have to be self-educated. Few of us have had the opportunity of going to Fort Leavenworth or the Army War College or the Navy War College, and the average officers have had no opportunity to learn anything in regard to their higher duties except by studying themselves or what they have learned from practical experience. It is our aim for all of our officers to have as good opportunities to obtain a military education as the officers of the Navy and the Army. Education is absolutely essential: An educated officers makes for educated men and an ignorant officer makes for ignorant men." Though the Army instruction was a good source for learning, Marines returning from the schools found themselves in an organization that differed significantly from the education they just received. 78 The majority of issues did not stem from the U.S. Army led curriculum, but rather the multiple competing narratives the still lingered within the Marine Corps on its specific role.
What was the role of the Marine Corps? Since its inception, the Marine Corps missions diversified heavily: fighting alongside the U.S. Army in the trenches of the French countryside, seizing and defending small islands, controlling governments, fighting bandits overseas, guarding legations around the world, providing detachments for Navy ship and protecting the U.S. Mail.
79
The multiple missions and duties of the Corps created competing narratives and opened a serious debate on the legitimation of the Marine Corps. What the Corps needed was a single narrative that guided the future planning and education and that could affect how the rest of world objectified the Marine Corps. Marines continued to debate throughout the 1920's with a few
Marine officers maintaining that they possessed the answer for the future of the Corps. 78 Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 36-37. 79 Ibid.
Brigadier General Smedley Butler believed an independent Marine Corps with little or no ties to the Navy was the future of the Corps. To Butler, pursuing missions similar to those assigned during the Great War in Europe and combating the Caribbean insurrections made a stronger Corps and reduced its reliance on the Navy. 80 Others, like Colonel Henry Davis, believed that focusing on small wars provided the Marines with a tailor-made mission. Always aboard Navy vessels, Marines responded quickly to numerous insurrections in Latin America and Asia.
Even while fighting in the First World War, Marines continued to fight various small wars in Latin America. 81 A third group believed the mission of the Corps tied directly into the mission of the Navy. Major General Commandant Lejeune held this belief after the war and recognized the conflict with other officers over the direction of the Corps.
82
"It caused, too, every effort to be made to convince officers and men of the soundness of the doctrine that the future of the Corps would be determined by their ability to serve efficiently with the Fleet in the conduct of the shore operations which are essential to the successful prosecution of naval campaigns in war, and which are essential to the successful conduct of the foreign policy of our country in peace."
83
In these few sentences, Major General Lejeune conveyed a vision to the institution in order to achieve legitimation of his understanding of the role of the Marine Corps. Essentially, for continued relevance, the Marine Corps needed to maintain close ties with the Navy and be able to fight alongside the U.S. Army in a major conflict. The Marine Corps could, with advanced base training and extensive amounts of expeditionary experience, work out a mission tailored made for the Marine Corps. 93 In a discussion about the lack of intellectual development in the Marine Corps, he once wrote, "Curiosity leads to investigation, which opens discussion, which gives rise to opinion, which breeds criticism, which results in improvement. All of this bespeaks a wide freedom in thought and an acute divergence from the arbitrary. 94 Breckinridge, "Some Thoughts on Service Schools," 231. 95 Bittner, Curriculum Evolution, [18] [19] Ibid. glance, it appeared that the Marine Corps had surrendered autonomy to the Navy, but, by creating an organization tied to the Navy's mission, the Marine Corps further institutionalized its chosen narrative and ensured that the Navy had a vested interest in the continued development of amphibious warfare, which the majority of Marines generally approved of. 102 However, the Marine Corps still required a theory and doctrinal foundation to guide its actions that allowed for the institutionalization of knowledge and continued legitimation.
The Development of Theory and Doctrine A critical task for the longevity of any organization is to develop original thought and analytical ability while balancing the necessary theory and doctrine to maintain a common narrative. It also creates a shared body of knowledge within the institution, allows for the social transmission of that knowledge, and helps construct objective truths about the institution. The Tentative Manual furnished detailed guidance on command relationships, naval gunfire support, aviation support, ship-to shore movement, securing the beachhead, and logistics.
As a naval operation, the Navy commander was in charge of the task force composed of the landing force, designated from units of the Fleet Marine Force and naval support groups. Thus, the amphibious operation relied on unity of command under the naval task force commander. To facilitate the movement and supply of the landing force once ashore, the Manual identified the importance of combat loading the ships based on the requirements of the landing force. The priority of embarkation of both personnel and equipment reflected the loading requirements based on the ground scheme of maneuver -those employed first were loaded last. Navy were small. Ships fitted as troop transports were not priorities for the Navy in fact or in theory, so as a stop-gap measure the responsibility fell to battleships and cruisers to carry Marines forces designated to conduct landings on the beach. Along with the refinement in landing techniques, the Marine recognized a need for suitable vessels that moved an assault force from the troop transports to its objective. Consequently, with the development of theory and doctrine, research began in pursuit for special equipment designed to support landing operations.
Established in 1933, the Marine Corps Equipment Board tasked to research, test, and recommend equipment required to support landing operations. 115 The identification and continued development of the equipment helped facilitate legitimation for the amphibious warfare theory and doctrine. Despite the austere budgets and a fiscally conservative Congress, the Marine Corps lobbied for increased funding for continue exploration of equipment that supported the seizure of 113 Millet, Semper Fidelis, [337] [338] [339] [340] [341] [342] [343] [344] [345] [346] [347] [348] [349] Progress and Purpose, [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] Ibid.
115 Millet, Semper Fidelis, 340. advanced bases, thus proving that the Marine Corps slowly became an objective reality outside the Marine Corps. Initially testing modified fishing boats, the Board became responsible for developing several types of vehicles that supported an amphibious landing. First, the Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP), designed to carry troops from ship-to-shore, developed from the Higgins "Eureka" boat. Next, the Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) designed to carry heavy equipment ashore, such as tanks and motor vehicles. Lastly, the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT)
or "amphibian" designed to be a fire support system able to operate on water and land.
Throughout the 1930's, the Marine Corps continued testing and evaluating potential vehicles and equipment to support an amphibious operations, but never received full support until war in the Pacific appeared imminent.
116

CONCLUSION
Institutions are real only in the minds of the people who have constructed them, and continue to be real as long as people learn and properly make use of their roles. For this to occur, the shared knowledge of their roles requires a transmission to future a generations. This requires some form of an "educational process" or system. The education process or system allows for potential actors to be thoroughly familiar with the meaning and purpose of 'institutionalized actions'. 117 According to Berger and Luckmann, "…there must be explanations and justifications of the salient elements of the institutional tradition. Legitimation is this process of explaining and justifying." 118 Simply stated, in order for the Marine Corps to survive it must continually "explain 116 Millet, Semper Fidelis, [337] [338] [339] [340] [341] [342] Progress and Purpose, [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] . 117 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, [69] [70] Ibid., 93.
and justify" its existence and have an educational system that can convey significance and remain "plausible and acceptable" and desired by society.
Throughout its existence, the Marine Corps performed many diverse and demanding duties, creating multiple competing narratives, and making it difficult to define its purpose. This Despite austere budgets, personnel reductions and constant deployments, the Marine Corps gathered the experiences and lessons learned from years of fighting in Latin America, the Caribbean, and China, to innovate significantly and help build a war fighting institution prepared to fight on the modern battlefield. In a relatively short period of time, the Marine Corps established, developed, and refined its professional military education system, while also continuing to send Marines to sister service educational and training schools, and a selected few to France.
Guided by a few Marine Corps visionary leaders, who foresaw a direction and projected future of the Corps and instituted a series of organizational and educational changes, ensured that
